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Preferred Provider Organizations and Provider
Contracting: New Analyses Under
the Sherman Act
Concerned with escalating health care costs,1 government, business,
and consumer groups have begun to demand reform. Consequently,
there have been unprecedented modifications in health care insurance
and reimbursement methods, 2 as well as regional experiments in health
care financing, regulation, and alternative delivery systems. Although
dissimilar in many respects, the resulting "cost-containment" programs
commonly eschew traditional fee-for-service pricing structures 3 in favor
of some method of large-scale discounting. These programs emphasize
increased use of competitive market principles.4
One form of reimbursement system, the Preferred Provider Organi-
zation ("PPO"), has experienced particularly rapid growth in response to
cost-containment demands. A PPO is a direct, prepaid health care
purchasing arrangement between a particular employer or insurer and a
health care provider.5 A typical PPO is characterized by a contract be-
tween a third-party payor and a provider to provide health care services
1. From 1965 to 1981, health expenditures grew from 6% to 9.8% of the gross national
product, and per capita expenditures exploded from $211 to $1225 per year, a 480% increase
over 16 years. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1981, 4 HEALTH CARE FI-
NANCING REV. 1, 19-20 (1982). Although there are some basic and unchangeable factors that
have fueled this increase, such as aging of the population, new medical technology, and the
generally increasing cost of resources, at least one commentator suggests that the principal
reason for the excessive rise is the increasing over-elaboration of medical practice styles. See
McClure, The Competition Strategy for Medical Care, 468 ANNALS 30, 35 (1983).
2. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 379-419
(1982).
3. A fee-for-serivce system is the typical form of pricing and selling in most personal
service industries today. In the medical field, an independent practitioner determines what
service (treatment) is necessary, provides that service, and sets an independently determined
price. Fee-for-service practice provides the physician with the greatest degree of autonomy
and with ultimate control over output and prices and is linked to higher costs for medicine.
See id. at 26. Fee-for-service payment contrasts both with the capitative approach, by which a
physician receives a flat sum per patient per year, see id. at 247, and the prepaid approach,
which is the subject of this Note.
4. McClure, supra note 1, at 31.
5. Negative Prognosis, BARRON'S, Aug. 19, 1985, at 28. For a more detailed explanation
of PPOs in the marketplace, see infra text accompanying notes 22-29.
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to the policyholders at a predetermined discounted price. 6 The key fea-
ture of the PPO is provider 7 reimbursement through prospective pay-
ments, payments determined and fixed by contract in advance of actual
treatment. PPOs have been labelled as the trend of the future in health
care delivery systems.
8
One implication of the PPO is that the traditional relationship
among patients, physicians, and insurance companies as third-party
payors has been altered-often radically,9 and possibly illegally. Fur-
thermore, if, as some health planners contend, we are witnessing the
birth of a newly organized $450 billion health care industry,' 0 its arrival
is accompanied by substantial litigation and intense antitrust scrutiny.
Individual practitioners have opposed contractually fixed fees I I and
have responded to the increase in PPOs by initiating a spate of litigation
in opposition. The individual providers have alleged that the fixed fees
restrain trade and competition for health care services in violation of the
Sherman Act ("Act"). I2 While courts have established fairly clearly
when a fixed-fee arrangement constitutes a restraint of trade in violation
of section 113 of the Act, courts have not conclusively determined
whether a PPO fixed-fee arrangement may constitute a monopoly in vio-
lation of section 2I4 of the Act.
This Note examines whether the fixed-fee component of the PPO
violates the Act, and under what circumstances such a violation would
be likely to occur. The Note begins by describing the relationship be-
tween health care providers and third-party payors in a PPO arrange-
ment. More specifically, it focuses on fee arrangements between
physicians and Blue Shield, 15 a powerful third-party payor leading the
6. In the context of this Note, "provider" refers to any individual practitioner rendering
service, such as a physician, dentist, or podiatrist.
7. See Comment, Antitrust and California's New Preferred Provider Organization Legis-
lation: A New Alternative in Health Care Cost Containment, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 121, 124
(1984).
8. See Hunt, PPOs: The Latest in the Commercialization of Medicine, PRIVATE PRAC.,
Nov. 1982, at 15; A New Cure for Health-Cost Fever, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 1982, at 117.
9. See generally The Upheaval in Health Care, Bus. WK., July 25, 1983, at 44.
10. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH IN-
SURANCE DATA 48 (24th ed. 1982-1983) (Projected expenditures for medical care in 1985 are
$456.4 billion.).
11. See Comment, supra note 7, at 141-42.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
13. Id. § 1.
14. Id. § 2.
15. Blue Cross and Blue Shield are private health insurers offering hospital and medical
serivce plans. The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association coordinates the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans of the nation, although each plan operates independently and is regulated by
its state insurance association. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note
10, at 6-25. The nonprofit member plans service statewide and other geographical areas, offer-
ing both individual and group coverage. Blue Cross plans provide hospital care benefits on
[Vol. 37
November 1985] PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
PPO movement.
The Note then reviews sections 1 and 2 of the Act, federal antitrust
law crucial to the evaluation of these fee arrangements. As part of this
discussion, the Note highlights the existing dichotomy in antitrust ideol-
ogy between the traditional distributive goals and the newer efficiency-
oriented goals.
The Note next discusses several early, foundational cases and exam-
ines the current litigation under sections 1 and 2 over fixed-fee arrange-
ments. The Note determines that, under section 1 analysis, an accurate
characterization of the insurer's role, as a third party to the provider-
patient relationship, establishes the necessary components to evaluate the
fee arrangements under a resale price maintenance model. With respect
to section 2 claims against PPOs, the Note argues that the courts in these
cases failed to consider a key element in antitrust analysis: the insurer's
market share. When an insurer has monopoly power in the market for
health care insurance, the fixed-fee arrangement imposed by the insurer
violates section 2 of the Act if, through vertical integration, 16 the insurer
uses its monopoly power in such a manner so as to cause anticompetitive
effects in the secondary market of physicians' services. The Note demon-
strates that, when an insurer is a monopolist in the market for health
insurance, the fixed-fee component of the PPO does in fact violate section
2 of the Act, regardless of whether a court follows a distributive or effi-
ciency-oriented antitrust policy.
PPOs in the Marketplace
Generally, there are three types of PPOs. First, the provider-based
PPO is organized by a hospital or physician who develops and markets a
network of services to payors of health care services. 17 The second type
of PPO, the purchaser-based PPO, is organized by a third-party payor
for health care services who recruits the participation of a sufficient
essentially a service type basis, under which the organization, through a separate contract with
member hospitals, reimburses the hospital for covered services provided to the insured. Blue
Shield plan benefits cover surgical and medical services performed by a physician or an other-
wise approved provider.
In 1982 there were 68 Blue Cross plans and 69 Blue Shield plans in the United States,
some of which were joint plans, making a total of 103 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. Id.
These plans covered approximately 40% of the national market for private medical insurance.
Id. at 14-17. This included hospital protection, surgical expense protection, physicians' ex-
pense protection, and major medical expense protection. Id. Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and
other plans paid aproximately 65% of the total $65 billion in private medical expense benefit
payments during that same time. Id. at 22. See generally Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control
by Third-Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 649-50
(1978).
16. See infra notes 177-79 & accompanying text.
17. Enders, The Preferred Provider Organization-Pro-Competitive Alternative or Anti-
trust Problem?, Hosp. FIN., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 42.
number and types of hospitals and professionals to satisfy the anticipated
patient load that the payor will provide.' 8 The third type of PPO is en-
trepreneur-based: an individual or business entity who is not a provider
of health care services organizes health care providers to render services
at a reduced cost. I9 The PPO is then marketed to large buyers of health
care services, such as self-insured employers or insurance companies.
Some PPOs include only primary care physicians, while others have a
comprehensive geographic and specialty network of doctors, hospitals,
pharmacies, and diagnostic facilities. 20 Most PPOs reimburse physicians
at ten to twenty percent below "usual and customary" charges.2 1
In 1983, Blue Shield established its first PPO.22 In this purchaser-
based program and those that have followed, Blue Shield determines in
advance a reasonable price for each service to be performed by a physi-
cian. 23 Blue Shield then contracts with each individual preferred pro-
vider physician to accept those fixed fees as payment in full for his
services. Under Blue Shield's preferred provider plans, a preferred pro-
vider is prohibited from engaging in any balance billing24 to the patients,
and any co-payment received from the patient, as required for certain
services, is deducted from the contract-specified fee. 25
A nonparticipating physician, one who chooses not to enter a con-
tractual relationship with Blue Shield, is not barred from treating Blue
Shield's insureds. There are, however, disincentives for the insured to
obtain care from a nonparticipating physician. First, services from a
nonparticipating physician could cost the patient significantly more.26
For example, Blue Shield may pay up to one hundred percent of the
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. O'Connor, Preferred Provider Organizations: A Market Approach to Health Care
Competition, Hosp. FIN., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 16.
2 1. Id.; accord Katz, Preferred Provider Organizations: New Relation of the HMO, POST-
GRADUATE MED., June 1983, at 143; Zannoth, PPO: 'Newest Kid on the Block' in Health
Care Delivery Systems, 81 MICH. MED. 627 (1982). Historically, the insurance industry reim-
bursed physicians on a cost basis for their "usual, customary, or reasonable" fees, which were
felt to reflect the prevailing community price. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1264
(4th Cir. 1983). A "ususal" fee is one a physician himself would charge for a given service.
"Customary" is that range of usual fees charged by physicians of similar training and experi-
ence for the same service. Id.; see P. STARR, supra note 2. at 385.
22. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, DIREC-
TORY OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (1985). In January 1985, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield together had 11 plans of this sort in the United States operating in nine states. See
id. at 1 passim.
23. See Blue Cross of California Participating Physician Agreement 5-6 [hereinafter cited
as Participating Physician Agreement] (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
24. See infra notes 144-47 & accompanying text.
25. Participating Physician Agreement, supra note 23, at 5.
26. See Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1265 (4th Cir. 1983); BLUE CROSS OF
CALIFORNIA, DIRECTORY OF PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS at i (1984).
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insured's bill for services from a participating provider, while Blue Shield
usually pays only fifty to eighty percent of the insured's bill for services
from a nonparticipating provider.27 Furthermore, when a patient is
treated by a nonparticipating provider, the patient must pay the physi-
cian directly and then seek reimbursement from Blue Shield for the al-
lowable percentage. 28 Conversely, if a patient receives treatment from a
participating provider, the physician is reimbursed directly by Blue
Shield for most transactions, 29 thereby removing the patient from the
payment process.
Relevant Antitrust Concepts
The Sherman Act and its Bifurcated Focus
The Sherman Act is the core of antitrust analysis.30 Section 1 of the
Act provides in pertinent part that "every contract, combination.., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... is... illegal."'31 Section 2 provides
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize... any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty .... -32
The policy underlying the Act is the promotion of competition.33 Two
doctrines are used to determine whether a certain business practice con-
stitutes a section 1 or section 2 violation: the per se rule and the rule of
reason. 34 Most section 2 claims are evaluated under the rule of reason.
35
Under the per se rule, no "elaborate study of the industry" is needed
to establish a violation of the Act; certain practices, the nature and neces-
sary effect of which "are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality," are "illegal
per se."' 36 The per se rule applies when the court has "experience with a
particular kind of restraint [or monopoly]" and is therefore able "to...
conclusive[ly] presum[e] that the restraint [or monopoly] is un-
reasonable."'37
27. Blue Cross of California Prudent Buyer Plan Service Agreement 15-16 (1984) [here-
inafter cited as Prudent Buyer Plan Agreement] (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
28. BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 26, at i; see Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718
F.2d 1260, 1264 (4th Cir. 1983).
29. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1264 (4th Cir. 1983).
30. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
31. Id.§l.
32. Id. §2.
33. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
34. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
35. H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 143 (Law. ed. 1985).
36. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978).
37. Id. at 692; see Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). Histori-
cally, the per se rule has applied to only a limited number of practices: price fixing; horizontal,
territorial, or customer division; concerted refusal to deal; RPM; and some tying arrange-
ments. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 126.
The rule of reason standard differs from the per se rule with respect
to the level of examination required. The rule of reason standard sets
forth the factors a court may consider when a business practice is not
plainly anticompetitive and that court lacks sufficient information to de-
termine whether that practice constitutes a restraint or a monopoly.
Under this standard, a court evaluates the competitive effects of a busi-
ness practice by analyzing the facts peculiar to the industry in which the
practice occurred, the history of the restraint, and any benefits unique to
the arrangement that might outweigh any negative impact on competi-
tion. Thus, when the court lacks sufficient experience with a business
practice or restraint, the rule of reason analysis guides the court in deter-
mining a practice's or restraint's competitive significance. 38
The scope of a court's evaluation of an activity's effect on competi-
tion under the rule of reason analysis depends upon that court's antitrust
ideology. Modern antitrust jurisprudents generally are divided into two
groups: the "Chicago School" jurisprudents, who espouse allocative effi-
ciency as the foremost and overriding goal;39 and those who look to the
history of the antitrust laws and demand consideration of nonefficiency
values or distributive goals.
40
The Chicago School's position has dominated antitrust analysis in
the past decade. 4' Allocative efficiency focuses on maximizing consum-
er welfare and is measured by the economic indicators of output and
price.42 An efficient business practice increases output or decreases price,
thereby promoting consumer welfare. Because consumer welfare is in-
creased, the practice is viewed as procompetitive and thus legal. On the
other hand, if a practice decreases output or increases price, the goal of
maximizing consumer welfare is defeated and the practice is viewed as
anticompetitive.
Traditional antitrust ideology espouses distributive goals such as
38. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 126.
39. E.g., 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103-113 (1978).
40. E.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 1-13 (1977); Schwartz,
"Justice"And Other Non-Economic Goals OfAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979). For a
discussion of the integration of the competing goals of antitrust, see Fox, The Modernization of
Antitrust: .4 New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Hovenkamp, Distributive
Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
41. A new mood emerged in the nation in the late 1970's. See Sims, Antitrust Law Is No
Business Opportunity Act, Legal Times of Washington, Mar. 10, 1980, at 11, col. 2. A shift in
the course of antitrust law followed changes in the composition of the Supreme Court. The
retirement of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas removed three justices who
were particularly outspoken in their articulation of power dispersion as a primary goal of
antitrust. While the word "power" dominated Warren Court opinions, the words "efficiency"
and "market impact" have become prominent in the Burger Court. See Broadcast Music Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. 36, 54-56, 58-59 (1977).
42. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 49.
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power dispersion, economic opportunity, and free market competition. 43
The recurrent theme is the protection of the interests of entrepreneurs
and small businesses. 44 The goals that further these interests are termed
distributive because their implementation redistributes wealth within so-
ciety.45 Measuring the achievement of these goals, however, does not
lend itself to economic definition; rather, measurement is through the
subjective interpretations of "restraint of trade"46 and "monopoly." 47
How the Fee Arrangements May Violate the Sherman Act
The fixed-fee component of a PPO may violate the antitrust laws in
three ways. First, the method of determining a PPO's reimbursement
rates may constitute a horizontal restraint of trade in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. A horizontal restraint of trade results when two
or more competitors enter an agreement that has an anticompetitive ef-
fect.48 If the reimbursement rates are determined by an agreement be-
tween two or more competing providers or insurers, this agreement
would be a classic horizontal restraint of trade. This horizontal restraint
of trade would constitute a violation of section 1 of the Act if the in-
surer's fee-setting board were controlled by service providers, or if either
overt or tacit collusion could be shown between the insurer and service
providers in determining the fees.
49
Second, the fixed-fee agreements themselves may constitute resale
price maintenance ("RPM"), a type of vertical restraint of trade that vio-
lates section 1 of the Act.50 RPM is defined as manufacturer or supplier
regulation of the price at which a product is resold by an independent
retailer.51 It traditionally occurs when a manufacturer sets either the
minimum or maximum price at which a distributor or retailer may resell
its product and is illegal per se.5 2 With respect to PPOs, the insurer and
43. Id. at 40-44.
44. See Fox, supra note 40, at 1167 ("Antitrust law historically has valued freedom and
autonomy of firms without market power."). The maxim that the antitrust laws protect "com-
petition not competitors" should be amended by adding "unless individual competitors must
be protected in the interests of preserving competition." Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1078.
45. While all antitrust policies are concerned with the distribution of wealth, implicit
within "distributive policies" is the recognition that there is an alternative policy that is more
efficient. Distributive policies distribute wealth in a way we find subjectively more attractive.
Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 2-3.
46. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
47. Id. §2.
48. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
49. See Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1982) (An agreement
among competing physicians setting maximum fees that may be claimed in full payment for
policyholders is illegal price fixing.); Kallstrom, supra note 15, at 679; infra notes 79-106 &
accompanying text.
50. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 247.
51. Id.
52. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 371 (1910); see Albrecht
the service providers also may stand in a vertical relationship to one an-
other. If the patient-insured occupies a third vertical slot, and the in-
surer-provider contracts are interpreted to set the price that providers
could charge their patients, the PPO would be a per se violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Act.
53
Third, a PPO could violate section 2 of the Act. A section 2 viola-
tion occurs if a monopolist in one market abuses its monopoly power by
vertically integrating into a secondary market, creating anticompetitive
effects in that secondary market.54 With respect to PPOs, two relevant
product markets 55 are involved: the market for health insurance itself in
which the insurer sells its coverage, and the market for provider services
in which physicians sell their services to fee-for-service patients. This
latter market is a secondary market. The insurer affects this secondary
market because every fee-for-service patient is a potential insured. A
consumer can receive the same service from a physician whether he pays
a fee to the physician or a premium to the insurer. Each patient who
decides to pay the premium rather than the fee diminishes the pool of
consumers in the market for physicians' services and increases the pool
of clients for which the insurer must acquire physician services. There-
fore, an insurer who has dominant market power in the sale of health
insurance also will have dominant market power in the purchase of phy-
sicians' services because it must acquire services from the physicians'
market to meet the needs of its insureds. Thus, a PPO could violate
section 2 if the insurer has dominant market power5 6 in a particular geo-
graphic market 57 and abuses this power.58
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211
(1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
53. See infra notes 75-90 & accompanying text.
54. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 146.
55. "A relevant [product] market is the smallest market for which the elasticity of de-
mand and supply are sufficiently low so that a firm with 100% of that market could profitably
reduce its output and increase its price substantially." H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 59.
In other words, if a price increase or volume decrease would cause consumers promptly to
substitute a different product, the market would not be wide enough in defined product terms.
See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 41. The courts consistently have held that the relevant
product market includes all products that are either identical to or available substitutes for the
defendant's product. 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 6.02[4] (1985 & Supp. June). "Determination of a relevant product market and a relevant
geographic market both address the same question: is there a grouping of sales in which the
defendant has market power?" H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 70 n.1.
56. To determine market power, the court determines a relevant product market, deter-
mines a relevant geographic market, and computes the defendant's percentage of output in the
relevant market thus defined. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 59.
57. The relevant geographic market is the area in which a firm can increase its price
without large numbers of its customers turning to alternative supply sources and without other
producers flooding the market with substitute products. Id. at 70-73; see United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966).
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Anticompetitive effects in a secondary market in violation of section
2 also may be caused by monopsony power, dominant purchasing power
within a relevant product market.5 9 Monopsony power, like monopoly
power, generally is presumed by the courts to be inherently dangerous to
competition and the public welfare.60 Thus, an insurer who exerts mo-
nopsony power in the market for physicians' services likely will cause
anticompetitive effects within that market.61
Prospective Payment Systems: Section 1 Challenges
The Foundation Cases
Horizontal: A Review of Maricopa 62 and its Continuing Role
The only United States Supreme Court case dealing directly with
physicians' maximum fee schedules as a means of health care cost con-
tainment is Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society.63 Maricopa involved a
fee-for-service plan administered by a nonprofit medical foundation. The
foundation was composed of approximately seventy percent of the li-
censed physicians engaged in private practice in Maricopa County, Ari-
zona. It was organized for the purposes of promoting fee-for-service
medicine and providing a competitive alternative to existing health insur-
ance plans in the community.
Under the foundation's plan, a subscriber64 was guaranteed com-
plete coverage for the full amount of his medical bills if he was treated by
a participating physician. Participating physicians agreed to accept
scheduled amounts as payments in full for their services to subscribers.
The physicians were free to charge less than the scheduled amount and
were unrestricted completely as to nonpolicy holders. The medical foun-
dation itself established and periodically revised the maximum fee sched-
ule through a vote of the entire foundation membership. 65 A subscriber
was free to employ nonparticipating physicians, but was covered only for
charges that did not exceed the maximum fee schedule.
The issue before the Maricopa Court was whether the doctors' con-
certed participation in the fee-setting mechanism should be declared ille-
58. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 145-49; see also E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW POLICY AND PROCEDURE 481-82 (1984).
59. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 17; Kallstrom, supra note 15, at 663 n.71.
60. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 17-18, 101 n.21.
61. See Kallstrom, supra note 15, at 668-69 ("[P]rice control agreements initiated by an
insurer with dominant power in the market would evoke the dangers associated with monop-
sony pricing."). But see Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886, 904-05
(1981) (monopsony inconceivable in most cases).
62. Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 339.
65. Id. at 341.
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gal per se or evaluated under the rule of reason. The Court held that
such agreements were subject to a per se standard even though they fixed
maximum rather than minimum prices. 66 Thus, in contrast to the rule of
reason analysis, the Court precluded any inquiry into the actual effects of
the fee-setting mechanism on consumers.
The Court also rejected the physicians' argument that the procom-
petitive effects of such an arrangement outweighed its anticompetitive
effects, reasoning that the "anti-competitive potential inherent in all
price-fixing agreements justifie[d] their facial invalidation even if procom-
petitive justifications [were] offered." '67 The Court stated that a price re-
straint of this sort "tends to provide the same economic rewards to all
practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their training, or
their willingness to employ innovative and difficult procedures in individ-
ual cases. Such a restraint [could] also . . .discourage entry into the
market and.., deter experimentation and new developments by individ-
ual entrepreneurs.
'68
The Court also noted that foundations, as physician cartels, had mo-
nopoly potential in the market for medical services. 69 It recognized that
with this power, the foundations could interfere with the market for
health care insurance, the secondary market in this situation, by dictat-
ing terms to all insurers within the relevant geographic market.70 The
ability of a physician foundation to dictate prices to competing health
insurers by virtue of its monopoly in the medical services' market would
reduce drastically price competition within the health care insurance
66. Id. at 348-50.
67. Id. at 351.
68. Id. at 348. Maricopa dealt exclusively with a horizontal fee-fixing arrangement. Ar-
guably, however, the potential anticompetitive effects of any arrangement fixing maximum fees
would be equally onerous. In this light, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether
an insurer-initiated system of fee fixing would stand up to antitrust attack. Id. at 352-53 n.26;
see also Easterbrook, supra note 61, at 898 (fee schedules promulgated by insurers less likely to
clear the market). Because the Blue Shield system in theory does not contain any agreement
between competitors and thus no element of horizontal price control, the legality of a system in
which the insurer imposes the maximum fees is recognized in dicta. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 352
n.25. But see Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 469 n.4 (1982) ("Blue Shield Plans are
combinations of physicians, operating under the direction and control of their physician mem-
bers." (quoting Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980)); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 232 n.40 (1979)
(Supreme Court noting that "[r]ecent studies have concluded that physicians and other health-
care providers typically dominate the boards ... of Blue Shield plans); Kallstrom, supra note
15, at 682-83; Rankin & Wilson, Sausalito Pharmacy and the Antitrust Consequences of In-
surer-Imposed Maximum Limitations on Fees, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 601, 608 (1982) (FTC sug-
gested flatly prohibiting physicians from serving on insurers' boards). It also should be noted
that the Court's neutral approach toward the legality of an insurer-imposed plan was in the
context of rebutting respondents' contention that only physicians could successfully implement
maximum fee schedules. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 353 n.26.
69. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 354 n.29.
70. Id. at 354.
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market. Although the Court did not speculate on this scenario's impact
on consumers, it recognized such secondary market behavior as a poten-
tially undesirable consequence of the physician-imposed maximum fees.
71
The Court's suggestion that interference in a secondary market by a
monopolist is objectionable should not be limited to interference caused
by a physician cartel. For instance, if the monopolist was an insurer with
the ability to dictate monoposony prices to competing physicians, the
result would again be interference in a secondary market-this time in
the market for physicians' services. Although the players have reversed
roles in this example, the similarities are striking: in both cases, the two
relevant product markets are health insurance and medical services; the
two groups of competitors involved are insurers and physicians; and the
instrument facilitating the market interference is maximum reimburse-
ment rates. Had the Court been confronted with this situation, it proba-
bly would have concluded that the same undesirable potential for
interference in a secondary market existed.
Maricopa has continued to be relevant in current antitrust actions
brought against PPOs for two reasons. First, Maricopa is the only
Supreme Court case involving a similar subject matter-a fixed-fee reim-
bursement system for physicians. Second, because of its substantive simi-
larity, physicians attacking PPOs as anticompetitive have relied on
Maricopa's per se condemnation of the fixed fees and, consequently, have
not alleged any anticompetitive effects resulting from such arrangements.
As a result, the courts have not examined the alleged impact of the agree-
ments on competition.
72
This omission in pleading, however, is understandable in light of the
fact that the contractually set fees in Maricopa, conclusively presumed to
be anticompetitive, are structurally identical to the contractually set fees
in PPOs today.73 Because the fee mechanisms themselves are operatively
identical, any anticompetitive effects flowing from them arguably should
be identical as well. If no allegation of the specific anticompetitive effects
was necessary in Maricopa, neither should it be necessary for PPOs.
This line of reasoning, however, fails to account for an important
difference between the fixed-fee arrangement in Maricopa and today's
PPOs: the nature of the fee-setting mechanism. In Maricopa, the physi-
cian's fees were fixed by physicians. This was horizontal price fixing and
thus per se illegal.74 In contrast, physicians' fees in PPOs are set by in-
71. Id.
72. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 124-34.
73. Both arrangements fix the maximum fee that a physician can receive for performing a
particular procedure; both guarantee a subscriber a set rate; although both allow subscribers to
select nonparticipating providers, both have built-in disincentives for subscribers to do so; and
both allow for periodic reevaluation of the level of the set fees by the group imposing the set
fees. The only significant difference lies in who imposes the fees.
74. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 347-48.
surers, not physicians, a practice that the Maricopa Court did not declare
per se illegal. Therefore, an antitrust attack against today's PPOs should
be pursued under the rule of reason doctrine rather than the per se rule.
In addition to Maricopa, one group of cases has had a significant
impact on the current controversy over fixed fees. The pharmacy cases
have defined and established the relationship between the insurer and
providers and, therefore, merit brief consideration.
Vertical: The Pharmacy Cases
The seminal pharmacy case is Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v.
Royal Drug Co.,75 which involved an allegation of a per se violation of
section 1 of the Act for resale price maintenance. 76 As stated earlier,
RPM is defined as manufacturer or supplier regulation of the price at
which a product is resold by independent retailers. 77 Because it describes
a relationship between a supplier and a buyer, rather than between direct
competitors, RPM is a vertical restraint.
In Royal Drug, Blue Shield's policies entitled each policyholder to
obtain any prescription from a participating pharmacy for a fixed price of
two dollars. Blue Shield then reimbursed each participating pharmacy
its cost,78 resulting in a two-dollar fixed profit per sale. A policyholder
who selected a nonparticipating pharmacy would be required to pay the
full price and then obtain reimbursement from Blue Shield. Blue Shield
would reimburse the subscriber seventy-five percent of the difference be-
tween the price paid and two dollars.79 Thus, subscribers patronizing
nonparticipating pharmacies would pay an additional twenty-five percent
and bear the burden of paying up front and then seeking reimbursement.
A group of independent pharmacists brought suit against Blue
Shield, claiming that Blue Shield's capped prescription rates constituted
RPM in violation of section 1 of the Act. Blue Shield argued that these
pharmacy agreements were part of the "business of insurance" and,
therefore, exempt from antitrust scrutiny.80 The district court ruled in
favor of Blue Shield and held that the challenged pharmacy agreements
75. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
76. See supra notes 50-53 & accompanying text.
77. Albrecht v. Herald Co, 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum RPM also illegal per se);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 247; see
supra text accompanying notes 50-53. The classic RPM model would exist in the context of
the pharmacy cases, if Blue Shield were held to be occupying the role of the supplier who
regulates the price the independent pharmacies may charge to consumers.
78. The pharmacy's cost was the price the pharmacy actually paid to acquire the drug
from the distributor, and did not include overhead or other retail transaction costs. Royal
Drug, 440 U.S. at 209.
79. Id.
80. Id. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), exempts
the "business of insurance" from the scope of the antitrust laws.
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fell within the "business of insurance" exception to the antitrust laws.8
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, and the pharma-
cists sought certiorari before the United States Supreme Court.
82
The Supreme Court held that the challenged pharmacy agreements
were not part of the "business of insurance" and, therefore, were subject
to antitrust scrutiny.83 Thus, the Court remanded the case to the district
court for a trial on the merits of the price-fixing allegations.84 In dicta,
the Court characterized the pharmacy agreements as "merely arrange-
ments for the purchase of goods and services by Blue Shield."' 85 This
language indicates that the requisite resale component for RPM is lack-
ing in fixed-fee schedules and has been relied on by lower courts in ana-
lyzing Blue Shield's relationship with pharmacies as well as with
providers in the fee schedule cases.
Before the district court decided on remand the price-fixing claim in
Royal Drug, the court in Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield 86 relied upon the Supreme Court's language in Royal Drug to de-
termine whether the same capped prescription rate agreements at issue in
Royal Drug violated section 1 of the Act.
The court in Medical Arts found that Blue Shield's pharmacy agree-
ments fundamentally differed from RPM agreements in that the phar-
macy agreements did not involve the resale of any product. 87 The only
price established by the pharmacy agreement was the price that Blue
Cross paid participating pharmacies for prescribed drugs. The consumer
was but an incidental party to the transaction: a third-party beneficiary
to a contract between Blue Cross and the pharmacy. "The price-fixing
within the scope of the per se prohibition of [section] 1 . . . is an agree-
ment to fix the price to be charged in transactions with third parties,
[and] not between the contracting paities themselves. ' 88 In Medical
Arts, there was a third-party beneficiary, but no third party to the
contract.
After Medical Arts was decided, Royal Drug's price-fixing claim was
81. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 207-08.
82. Id. at 208.
83. Id. at 210-17. The Supreme Court extensively analyzed this exemption and identified
three criteria relevant in determining whether a particular practice is part thereof: first,
whether the practice has the effect of risk spreading, id. at 211-15; second, whether the practice
is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured, id. at 215-16;
and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry, id. at 231.
The Court found none of these factors present in the challenged pharmacy agreements.
84. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Health & Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 912 (1985).
85. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 214.
86. 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982).
87. Medical Arts, 518 F. Supp. at 1107.
88. Id. (quoting Sitken Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 446 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978)).
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tried and the pharmacy agreements between the physicians and the phar-
macies were upheld against a section 1 challenge. 89 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding, echoing the Medical Arts court by
stating that "[a]bsent any evidence of the presence and abuse of monop-
oly power, Blue Shield has the clear right to bargain for the lowest prices
and best deal for itself and its customers/insureds." 90
Thus, the pharmacy cases established that the nature of the contrac-
tual relationship between an insurer and a pharmacy was a mere
purchasing agreement. This characterization definitionally precluded a
successful RPM claim because no resale price was imposed vertically.
The Current Cases
This section discusses the recent litigation surrounding fixed-fee
schedules that has evolved in the shadows of Maricopa9' and the phar-
macy cases. Together, Maricopa and the pharmacy cases provide a foun-
dational analysis for the major challenges against PPOs. Due in part to
poor pleading, 92 and in part to oversimplification of the relationship of
the parties in the pharmacy cases, the courts have, for the most part,
analyzed fixed-fee schedules only under two familiar components of sec-
tion 1 of the Act: horizontal price fixing and vertical resale price
maintenance.
Horizontal Restraints of Trade
Allegations of price fixing through fixed-fee schedules have been
most frequently examined under a horizontal model.93 This could be be-
cause, after Maricopa, horizontal claims against fixed-fee schedules are
subject to the per se standard, which is easier to plead because allegations
of anticompetitive effects are not required.9 4
The circuit courts have made it clear that evidence of collusion is
required to challenge fixed fees9 5 as a horizontal restraint.9 6 Collusion
89. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Health & Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 912 (1985).
90. Id. at 1438. In this most recent Royal Drug ruling, the court suggested that the
agreements might have been evaluated differently had there been allegations of the presence or
use of monopoly power. Id. at 1439. Although plaintiffs referred to Blue Shield as a "power-
ful buyer," id. at 1437, to the great number of pharmacy customers covered by the agreements,
they failed to assert any statistics on market share, mention a monopsony buyer, or allege
misuse of monopoly power in violation of § 2.
91. Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); see supra notes 63-74 &
accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 65-67 & accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 72-74, infra notes 100-14 & accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
95. Providers typically challenge fixed fees either because their particular medical special-
ity is under-represented on the insurer's board, and thus does not receive "protected pricing,"
see St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
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can be established by either an express agreement between competitors,
as in Maricopa, actual or constructive control of the insurer's decision
making body by physician competitors, 97 or any demonstrable participa-
tion by competitor physicians in determining the fee schedules.98 For
example, if providers possessed veto power within the insurer's decision-
making body, they could control that body. In this position, competing
providers could argue amongst themselves on fees, membership, and
other board policies.
Courts also have been receptive to allegations of novel horizontal
control mechanisms to establish collusion. This is exemplified in Ratino
v. Medical Service,99 a potentially important case on remand to the dis-
trict court of Maryland. In Ratino, a plastic surgeon brought an action
against Blue Shield alleging a horizontal price-fixing scheme through
which competitor physicians controlled the Blue Shield board.'°0 Plain-
tiff alleged that the physicians controlled the fee schedule in two ways.
First, rather than an express agreement to set fees, physicians retained
control as a result of the Blue Shield board policies. These policies pro-
vided that Blue Shield would not change any of its plan mechanics
"without approval of the participating physicians." 101 Second, plaintiff
claimed that physicians collectively exerted control over the maximum
fee schedule by methodically submitting higher and higher bills to Blue
Shield until their fees exceeded the maximum rate, a more indirect hori-
zontal mechanism. 10 2 By doing this, physicians were guaranteed to re-
ceive the maximum fee reimbursement. At the same time, the
supracompetitive bills continually escalated the maximum allowable fee
104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); see also Addino v. Genesee Valley Medical Care Inc., 593 F. Supp. 892
(W.D.N.Y. 1984), or because they have declined to contract with the insurer to become a
preferred provider due to dissatisfaction with the reimbursement rates. See Pennsylvania Den-
tal Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2021
(1985); Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984).
96. By definition, a § I violation requires a "combination ... or conspiracy ... in re-
straint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); see Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57;
Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2021 (1985); Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 740 F.2d 423,
431 (6th Cir. 1984); Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1270 (4th Cir. 1983); St. Bernard
Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 712 F.2d 978, 985 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Addino v.
Genesee Valley Medical Care Inc., 593 F. Supp 892, 895 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
97. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1271 (4th Cir. 1983) (If physicians control
the fee, the practice is illegal per se.); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1980) (Physician control of Blue Shield Board brings its
actions within the purview of § 1 of the Sherman Act.).
98. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1270 (4th Cir. 1983) (program that
camouflages an agreement among competing physicians illegal per se).
99. 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 1271.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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schedule. 103
The Fourth Circuit decided only that the issues raised were "com-
ple[x], nove[l], and importan[t]" triable issues of fact for a jury and re-
manded the case to the district court.' 04 The court noted, however, that,
although there was no evidence of an overt agreement among competing
physicians to establish maximum fee schedules as in Maricopa, the pro-
gram as described might camouflage such an agreement.10 5 If it did, it
would be per se illegal price fixing under Maricopa.10 6
The district court in Addino v. Genesee Valley Medical Care Inc. 107
also was receptive to an allegation of a novel horizontal control mecha-
nism. In Addino, providers alleged that physicians controlled the Blue
Shield board and had conspired with Blue Shield to lower the reimburse-
ment rates for podiatric procedures. 108 The plaintiffs provided evidence
of physician control of the board as well as a built-in majority of physi-
cians on two critical committees which controlled rates, membership,
and board composition. 109 The court, relying on Maricopa110 and United
States v. Trenton Potteries,"'I granted summary judgment to the plain-
tiffs, holding that the mere power of the physicians to control fees was
sufficient to establish collusion. 12
Because Maricopa provides precedential support and dicta exists in
subsequent cases recognizing various types of horizontal control mecha-
nisms,113 a claim that fixed fees constitute a horizontal restraint in viola-
tion of section 1 is straightforward, and the outcome is fairly
predictable. 14 In contrast to this relatively clear area of antitrust law,
confusion surrounds the treatment of vertical claims regarding fixed-fee
schedules.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1268.
105. Id. at 1270.
106. Id.; see United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
107. 593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
108. Id. at 894-95.
109. Id. at 896, 898.
110. For a discussion of Maricopa, see supra notes 63-74 & accompanying text.
111. 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (agreements that create potential power to fix prices illegal
per se).
112. Addino, 593 F. Supp. at 901.
113. See Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 257 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2021 (1985); Ratino, 718 F.2d at 1270.
114. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 257 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2021 (1985); Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984); Ratino, 718 F.2d 1260; St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv.
Ass'n, 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); Virginia Academy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980); Addino, 593 F. Supp. 892.
But see Human Resource Inst. v. Blue Cross, 498 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D. Va. 1980) (no direct
evidence of provider control although enabling statute required majority of board be
subscribers).
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Resale Price Maintenance
Few areas of antitrust law have provoked more controversy than
vertical restraints;I 5 claims of resale price maintenance are no exception.
This confusion is responsible for much of the existing inconsistency
among the circuits over the legality of fixed-fee schedules.
To sustain a claim of RPM under traditional analysis, the providers
must demonstrate that an insurer, as an outside third party contracting
with individual providers, established the prices those providers could
charge their patients.' 16 That is, the providers must demonstrate that a
resale existed, that the resale price was determined by the insurer, and
that the resale price was not just announced unilaterally by the
insurer. 117
Adhering to the reasoning of Royal Drug,118 courts traditionally
have held that fixed-fee schedules do not constitute resale price mainte-
nance. 119 These courts viewed the insurer as being in the business of
buying services for its clients and fixed-fee schedules as only contracts
between the insurer and service providers.' 20 Thus, the fixed-fee sched-
ules lacked the necessary resale component of RPM.
The court in Ratino,12 1 however, appears to have cast doubt on this
traditional analysis by broadening the scope of inquiry in determining
whether fixed-fee schedules constitute RPM. In addition to a claim of
horizontal restraint,1 2 2 the plaintiff in Ratino alleged that the maximum
fee schedule established by Blue Shield, coupled with both direct and
115. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 247.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
117. A legally vital defense to a charge of resale price maintenance is available under the
Colgate doctrine. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The doctrine recog-
nizes the long-standing right of a private trader unilaterally to announce in advance the cir-
cumstances under which he will refuse to deal. Because the Colgate exception covers only a
unilateral announcement of terms by the trader, it would not be available to an insurer who
contractually binds the providers to its terms. See Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 518 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982)
(court rejects defendant's argument that pharmacy agreements are unilateral).
118. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). For a discus-
sion of Royal Drug, see supra notes 67-76 & accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 75-90 & accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Webster County Memorial Hosp. v. United Mine Workers, 536 F.2d 419
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (hospital agrees to set maximum rate in exchange for direct payment); Feld-
man v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (cap on balance billing by
participating pharmacies); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clin-
ics, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Clinics could not charge higher
rates to Blue Cross members than to nonmembers.); see also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALY-
sis 530 (3d ed. 1981) ("[I]t is difficult to see what could make [such an] agreement
anticompetitive.").
121. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.
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indirect coercion, resulted in RPM. 123 Plaintiff specifically alleged that
the peer utilization review committees, which acted as policing mecha-
nisms, 124 and Blue Shield's unlawful use of its monopoly power 125 di-
rectly coerced physicians into conformity with the set fees. Plaintiff also
alleged that several characteristics of the Blue Shield plan amounted to
indirect coercion. By paying the bills of participating physicians directly,
but requiring each insured seeking services from a nonparticipating pro-
vider to pay the physician in full and then seek reimbursement from Blue
Shield, the subscriber seeing a nonparticipating doctor bore a much
greater burden. 126 In addition, since Blue Shield's format covered "rea-
sonable" fees, the nonreimbursable amount was impliedly unreasona-
ble. 127  Finally, Blue Shield encouraged clients employing non-
participating physicians to obtain future services from participating phy-
sicians unless the nonparticipating physician lowered his fee. 128
As previously stated, the Ratino court decided only that the issues
raised were triable issues of fact for the jury. 1 29 Thus, the court did not
directly discuss whether RPM was established. In remanding to the dis-
trict court, however, it gave two important instructions.
First, the court stated that, because of the court's "limited experi-
ence with these types of arrangements," if no per se violation was found,
the district court should proceed to analyze the facts under the rule of
reason. 130 Second, the court noted that Blue Shield's alleged monopolis-
tic position was a factor to consider when analyzing the competitive ef-
fects of the fee arrangements. 131
The court's instruction to engage in a rule of reason analysis if nec-
essary could apply to plaintiff's claim of RPM. A rule of reason analysis
is used when the restraint or industry in which the restraint occurs is
novel and permits consideration of anticompetitive effects of the alleged
restraint. In Ratino, the parties involved in the fee agreements created a
123. The Ratino court fails to denote the horizontal or vertical nature of plaintiff's claims.
It is clear, however, that reference to "provider agreements" refers to the contracts running
between Blue Shield and the providers that impose the maximum fees. Ratino, 718 F.2d at
1262. Therefore, plaintiff's claim that the agreements standing alone constitute price fixing is
a vertical claim of RPM.
124. Id. at 1271.
125. Id. at 1262 n.5.
126. Id. at 1264.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1265.
129. See supra note 104 & accompanying text.
130. Ratino, 718 F.2d at 1272. Although the court fails to denote this specifically as
RPM, it does cite two well-known RPM cases in support of its conclusion that "inexperience
with these types of agreements" makes a rule of reason analysis appropriate. Id. (emphasis
added) (citing Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205; Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1980)).
131. Ratino, 718 F.2d at 1272.
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novel restraint because they did not neatly fit the supplier-retailer-con-
sumer model, 132 yet there was an obvious limitation on price. Thus, the
Ratino court's instruction could be construed as permitting a rule of rea-
son analysis for RPM claims. The court's acknowledgement of the po-
tential impact on competition by an insurer with dominant market share
also was insightful. By recognizing that factors external to the parties'
agreement may determine the legality of the agreement under the Act,
the court greatly broadened the scope of inquiry for fee schedule cases.
Although somewhat factually dissimilar, the Third Circuit in Penn-
sylvania Dental Association v. Medical Service Association, 33 supported
the Ratino court's departure from traditional analysis. In Pennsylvania
Dental, the court evaluated claims of a vertical restraint of trade resulting
from insurer-provider agreements much like those in Ratino.134
The Third Circuit reasoned that the insured was a purchaser of ser-
vices, 135 and that Blue Shield was actually an indemnitor. Because the
patient-insured "purchased,"1 36 the court concluded that a resale existed.
Additionally, the court found that the necessary elements for a claim of
RPM were alleged because the providers also specifically claimed that
they had been coerced economically into accepting the reimbursement
rates. 137 Therefore, departing from past analysis,138 the court recognized
that allegations of both the elements of RPM and economic coercion
could give rise to a rule of reason analysis under an RPM claim. The
court rejected the providers' allegations of economic coercion, however,
because Blue Shield lacked the necessary market power. 139
132. The health care industry is characterized pervasively by the absence of arms-length
relationships or incomplete vertical integration, in which parties have partially shared and
partially conflicting interests. For an excellent analysis of the patterns of control among con-
sumers, providers, and insurers, see Evans, Incomplete Vertical Integration in the Health Care
Industry: Pseudomarkets and Pseudopolicies, 468 ANNALS 60 (1983).
133. 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2021 (1985).
134. Id. at 256.
135. Id. Although the court did not explain the context in which a subscriber could
purchase, the subscriber could purchase in two situations. The most significant of these times
occurs before an insured has reached his particular deductible under the insurance plan. In
this situation, the physician still is bound contractually to charge the maximum fee, although it
is the client who purchases the service directly from the physician and pays the fee directly to
the physician. In effect, Blue Shield's sole role in this instance would be that of a third party
determining the price a provider could charge his patient. A second instance occurs if the
insured receives a medical procedure that requires a co-payment. See, e.g., Prudent Buyer
Plan Agreement, supra note 27, at 15 (Expenses incurred for mental disorders are paid 50% by
Blue Cross and 50% by the insured.). Again, a maximum fee has been set contractually, but in
this instance, both the insurer and the insured pay for the procedure. See Participating Physi-
cian Agreement, supra note 23, at 5 (deductibles and co-payments subtracted from the estab-
lished fee).
136. See supra text accompanying note 135.
137. Pennsylvania Dental, 745 F.2d at 256.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 259. In the relevant geographic market of Pennsylvania, Blue Shield plans
The indemnitor label is significant because it recognizes the tripar-
tite nature of the insurer-provider agreements. Whereas a purchase tra-
ditionally involves only two parties, the buyer and the seller,
indemnification by definition involves the essential third party to RPM
analysis. In this case, the insurer bargained on behalf of itself and ulti-
mate consumers, and therefore, the resale was atypical. Thus, rather
than the typical supplier-buyer RPM model, the fee agreements in Penn-
sylvania Dental involved a tripartite relationship.
The decision in Pennsylvania Dental is significant for two reasons.
First, the court's characterization of Blue Shield as an indemnitor rather
than a purchaser is more accurate. A pure indemnification140 occurs
when a subscriber seeks health care from a physician of choice, negoti-
ates the price of that treatment with the physician, and is reimbursed for
all or part of that cost by the indemnitor.' 4 ' Although the Blue Shield
plan does not precisely fit this "pure" model, characterizing Blue Shield
as a purchaser because it is the ultimate payor is overly simplistic. Blue
Shield does not participate in the decision of which health service is nec-
essary, nor does it determine when or how that service will occur. In
addition, Blue Shield as an entity cannot receive the services it is said to
purchase. Furthermore, physicians traditionally have opposed as unethi-
cal any financial arrangement that involved "selling" their services to
anyone but the patient. 142 The legal and fiduciary relationship between
doctor and patient further attenuates Blue Shield's characterization as a
purchaser.
Second, the indemnitor characterization recognizes the tripartite na-
ture of the insurer-provider agreements and, therefore, provides a foun-
dation upon which to base an RPM claim. Viewing Blue Shield as a third
party affecting the price charged in a transaction involving two other
parties, the court properly can analogize the Blue Shield plan to those
typically found in RPM cases. 143
In a case decided after Pennsylvania Dental, Kartell v. Blue
Shield, 144however, the First Circuit rejected Pennsylvania Dental's char-
acterization of the insurer as an indemnitor. In Kartel, physicians al-
leged that the "ban on balance billing" provision in a Blue Shield plan
insured only 35% of those with private insurance and represented only 9% of dental care
purchased.
140. Indemnify: "[T]o make good a loss one person has suffered in consequence of the act
... of another .. " W. JowITr, JowITT's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1977).
141. P. STARR, supra note 2, at 291-94.
142. See Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 978-80 (1954) (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS art. 5, ch. 3, § 4).
143. See generally cases cited in 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 55, § 613.01-03.
144. 582 F. Supp. 734 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 204 (1985).
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was illegal under sections 1 and 2 of the Act. 145 The Blue Shield plan
required contracting physicians to accept Blue Shield's payments as the
sole payment for their services. 146 This "ban on balance billing" provi-
sion, therefore, prohibited participating physicians from billing their pa-
tients for the balance. 147
The district court used a rule of reason analysis 148 to determine
whether the Blue Shield plan violated the Act. The district court found
abundant evidence149 of specific anticompetitive effects resulting from the
Blue Shield plan.' 50 Reasoning that Blue Shield, through its monopoly
power in the market for prepaid health care in Massachusetts, exerted
sufficient economic pressure to force physicians into agreeing to Blue
Shield's plan, 51 the district court enjoined the plan as an unreasonable
vertical restraint of trade under section 1.152 Referring to Maricopa,
53
the district court stated that "[t]he mere fact that the Blue Shield plan in
this case does not constitute per se horizontal price fixing does not make
its adverse impact on competition any less objectionable than the plan
struck down ... in Maricopa.'
'154
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed.' 55 The court's decision turned
on its threshold characterization of the relationship between Blue Shield
145. Id. at 735-36.
146. Id. at 738.
147. Id. The plaintiffs in Kartell took a novel approach to their claim by attacking not the
fixed fees themselves, but rather the ban on physician balance billing. A ban on balance billing
may more clearly represent a legally cognizable restraint of trade as well as measurable injury
to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs here, however, acknowledged that health insurers are entitled to bargain
for and limit what they pay to physicians for medical services rendered to subscribers and
contested only the insurer's right to limit the total amount a physician could receive for medi-
cal services rendered. Id. at 748 n.18.
148. Kartell has a procedural history spanning several years; a rule of reason standard was
determined to be proper for this case by the district court in Kartell v. Blue Shield, 542 F.
Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1982). Kartell, 582 F. Supp. at 737.
149. Kartell, 582 F. Supp. at 748.
150. The court found that Blue Shield's system provided the same economic reward to all
practitioners regardless of their skill, that it discouraged physicians from undertaking the
training and incurring the expense of new equipment to learn and offer new and innovative
(and qualitatively better) procedures, and that it made Massachusetts a less attractive place to
practice medicine. Id. at 751-53; see also Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
348 (1982).
151. Kartell, 582 F. Supp. at 751, 748.
152. Id. at 755. The § 2 claims brought by plaintiffs were dismissed because the § 1 claims
were dispositive.
153. Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). For a discussion of Mari-
copa, see supra notes 63-74 & accompanying text.
154. Kartell, 582 F. Supp. at 750 (footnote omitted).
155. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
204 (1985).
and the providers. Agreeing with Royal Drug, 156 the court characterized
the Blue Shield plan as "merely [an] arrangement[ ] for the purchase of
goods and services by Blue Shield."'' 57 As in Royal Drug and the other
pharmacy cases,' 58 this characterization precluded plaintiff's RPM
claim. The First Circuit also rejected the district court's emphasis on
market power. 159 Although the First Circuit conceded that Blue Shield
had monopoly power, and that it may have used that power to set unrea-
sonable and uncompetitive prices, the court maintained that a monop-
sonist is free to exploit its market power to bargain for all but predatory
prices. 160 The court stated that the desirability of lowering insurance
costs, and the availability of state regulation, 161 combined to "counsel...
against extending [the law] to authorize increased judicial supervision of
the buyer/seller price bargain."' 1 62 Thus, the First Circuit held that the
Blue Shield plan did not constitute RPM or an unreasonable horizontal
restraint of trade and vacated the injunction.
163
The First Circuit's opinion in Kartell is flawed in two respects.
First, the court improperly characterized the relationship between Blue
Shield and the providers as a buyer-seller arrangement. The Third Cir-
cuit's characterization in Pennsylvania Dental 164 of Blue Shield as an in-
demnitor rather than "merely a purchaser" of services more accurately
reflects the nature of the Blue Shield plan. That plan provides for
purchasing by the insured and puts the doctor and patient in a traditional
treatment relationship in all respects but one; the physician lacks any
control over the price that patient will pay.165 The First Circuit, in fact,
recognized the weakness in the purchaser characterization when it as-
serted that "[w]hether for ethical, medical, or related professional pur-
poses Blue Shield ... is not ... considered a buyer is beside the point."'
166
This bifurcated reasoning is illogical. Blue Shield's role in the health
care industry should not be characterized as a purchaser for legal pur-
poses and as an indemnitor for other purposes. Simply because Blue
156. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). For a discus-
sion of Royal Drug, see supra notes 75-85 & accompanying text.
157. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 924-25 (quoting Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 214); see also Medical
Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); Travellers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross,
481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
158. See supra notes 86-90 & accompanying text.
159. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 926.
160. Id. at 927. Predatory pricing generally refers to a business' efforts to acquire or pre-
serve monopoly power by underselling its rivals through prices set below short term marginal
cost. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 172-75.
161. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 928, 930-31.
162. Id. at 931.
163. Id. at 934.
164. Pennsylvania Dental, 745 F.2d at 256-57 (The court stated that it was more accurate
to characterize Blue Shield as indemnitor than as a purchaser.).
165. See supra notes 5-8 & accompanying text.
166. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 926.
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Shield's "activities here are like those of a buyer," 167 the court should
not make Blue Shield a legal purchaser for antitrust purposes. The legal
characterization of Blue Shield's role should reflect its total relationship
to the parties. This fundamental mischaracterization by the court taints
its entire opinion.
Second, the First Circuit failed to consider whether the Blue Shield
plan violated section 2 of the Act. While the court conceded that Blue
Shield had monopoly power, 168 it failed to consider the district court's
reasoning that Blue Shield's monopolistic behavior in one market had an
anticompetitive impact on a secondary market, thereby implicating a vio-
lation of section 2.169 Because the court conceded that Blue Shield had
market power in its primary market, it should have evaluated the com-
petitive effects of Blue Shield's power in a vertically linked secondary
market.
In sum, no section 1 RPM claim against a fixed-fee schedule to date
has been analyzed under the rule of reason. Rule of reason treatment of
such claims was precluded by the original characterization of the parties
to the arrangement by the Supreme Court in Royal Drug.170 Recently,
however, the Fourth Circuit in Ratino17 1 and the Third Circuit in Penn-
sylvania Dental 72 have recognized that the PPO fee arrangements are
sufficiently novel to warrant a rule of reason analysis. This recognition
suggests an awareness of the need to evaluate thoroughly the competitive
effects of PPOs in the marketplace. A section 2 challenge to PPOs would
afford the courts an opportunity for such thorough analysis.
Prospective Payment Systems: Section 2 Challenges
Physician challenges to the fixed-fee component of PPOs have fo-
cused largely on section 1 of the Sherman Act. In certain circuits, how-
ever, a viable cause of action may exist under section 2 of the Act173 for
illegal use of monopoly power.
The test for illegal monopolization under section 2 has two compo-
nents: presence of a large amount of market power in the relevant geo-
graphic and product markets, and monopoly conduct, which is defined as
engaging in certain anticompetitive acts.174 To establish a section 2 viola-
tion by an insurer, a physician must prove that the insurer has monopoly
167. Id. (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 927.
169. 582 F. Supp. at 734; see supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
170. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Health & Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 912 (1985); see supra notes 86-90 & accompanying text.
171. Ratino, 718 F.2d 1260; see supra notes 121-32 & accompanying text.
172. Pennsylvania Dental, 745 F.2d 248; see supra notes 133-43 & accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 54-58 & accompanying text.
174. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 135-58.
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power in the market for health care insurance in the relevant geographic
area175 and that the insurer used this monopoly power in an anticompeti-
tive manner, such as by engaging in exclusionary practices 176 or by verti-
cal integration.
When a business integrates vertically it obtains a certain amount of
control over its products' distribution or sale at another level of the pro-
duction-distribution chain. Vertical integration often enables firms to
provide better products or services at lower prices. 177 Courts, however,
traditionally have perceived vertical integration as a substantial threat to
competition. 178 One of the primary anticompetitive threats is that the
monopolist will not only cause anticompetitive effects at a new level, but
also will acquire a second monopoly at that level. 79
Market Power
The facts of a recent First Circuit case illustrate the impact of an
insurer's market power on providers. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachu-
setts s0 involved an allegation by a group of physicians that a "ban on
balance billing" provision in a Blue Shield plan violated the Sherman
Act. Although Kartell was decided under a section 1 analysis, its facts
also supported a section 2 allegation of abuse of monopoly power
through vertical integration.'l8 Apparently without recognizing its sig-
nificance, the district court laid the foundation for such a claim when it
specified the relevant markets at issue in the insurer-provider
175. Monopoly power is loosely defined as "the power to control prices or exclude compe-
tition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Older
cases required a very high degree of market control to establish monopoly power. See, e.g.,
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 156 (1911) (95% of cigarette sales in
the United States); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 33 (1911) (90% of national
refining capacity). Later cases suggest that less market power may be sufficient. See, e.g..
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 102 (1948) (film distribution monopoly in 51-62% of
towns); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1204
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976) (45-70% of market supports jury finding of
monopoly). More recently, the Fifth Circuit announced that there is no rigid rule requiring
even 50% market control, although 20% is clearly not enough. Yoder Bros. v. California-
Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1367-68 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1094 (1977).
176. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 142-43; E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 58, at 455. Exclusionary practices are those acts undertaken by someone with
market share to either acquire or maintain monopoly power, for example, predatory pricing or
integration into a different market. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, AN-
TITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 109 (2d ed. 1984).
177. E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, at 481.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 482.
180. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 204 (1985). For a full factual
discusssion of the case, see supra notes 144-47 & accompanying text.
181. See supra note 150 & accompanying text.
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transactions.
1 82
The district court in Kartell determined that the relevant product
markets at issue were the health insurance and the physicians' services
markets. The relevant geographic market was the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Blue Shield clearly dominated the health care insurance
market by providing coverage for seventy-four percent of the privately
insured population in Massachusetts.' 83 This represented fifty-six per-
cent of the Commonwealth's population, or 3.2 million total subscrib-
ers.184 Thus, the district court established Blue Shield's monopoly power.
Because the First Circuit conceded that Blue Shield had monopoly
power, it should have inquired whether Blue Shield had used its monop-
oly power in an anticompetitive fashion. Evidence of vertical integration
resulting in anticompetitive effects would satisfy the second prong of the
section 2 test: monopoly conduct.
Monopoly Conduct: Vertical Integration
In the context of PPOs, the secondary market susceptible to vertical
integration by an insurer is the market for provider services. Providers
compete with one another in this market to sell their services to the total
patient population, which includes those with and without private health
care insurance. An insurer affects this market by soliciting its clients
from the population interested in health insurance. Every subscriber
who enrolls in a PPO is entitled to health care in the form of provider
services and is guaranteed a relatively ascertainable ceiling on the cost of
those services so long as he is treated by participating providers.
To make its participating providers easily identifiable, Blue Shield
publishes and mails to each subscriber, along with literature encouraging
patronage, a list of participating providers. 185 Because subscribers re-
ceive full coverage when they seek treatment from participating provid-
ers and they must pay nonparticipating providers up front and then seek
reimbursement from Blue Shield, it is reasonable to assume that Blue
Shield's subscribers prefer to use participating providers. Consequently,
the patient market for any provider who does not contract with an in-
surer, as well as the open market for physician's services, is diminished
automatically.
The fixed-fee compensation scheme potentially distorts the market
place even further. Faced with a diminishing fee-for-service patient pop-
ulation, resistant providers would be forced to capitulate and participate
in PPOs just to maintain access to the marketplace. Although providers
182. Kartell, 582 F. Supp. at 743.
183. Id. at 741.
184. Id. at 739, 741.
185. See, e.g., BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 26. It should be noted that Blue
Cross claims no endorsement of any provider it lists. Id. at i.
may view the rates set by the insurer as unreasonable and uncompetitive,
the insurer's monopoly in the health insurance market could coerce pro-
viders into accepting the contractual agreements without an opportunity
for independent evaluation or the exercise of sound business judgment.
In summary, by exercising monopoly power in the market for health
insurance, the insurer could interfere with competition in the market for
physicians' services by methodically shrinking that second market.
Whenever an insurer is shown to have a monopoly in its primary market,
a likely consequence is the establishment of a monopsony in this second
market. A monopsony would occur if the insurer became the dominant
purchaser of physicians' services.
The Anticompetitive Effects
Demonstrating that a monopolist has integrated vertically into a
secondary market does not end the inquiry. In order to succeed on a
section 2 claim, plaintiffs also must show that the market power and ver-
tical integration have resulted in unreasonable anticompetitive effects.' 86
Historically, acquisition of a second monopoly has been presumed
to be anticompetitive for two reasons. First, courts have recognized that
additional monopoly profits could be obtained through this secondary
monopoly,18 7 thereby giving the monopolist a double monopoly. Second,
the secondary monopoly acts as a barrier to entry in the primary market
by forcing any potential entrant to enter competitively two market levels
instead of one. 1
88
As a result of the Chicago School's economic focus on allocative
efficiency, this presumption has been the subject of increasing criticism.
Chicago School commentators argue that, in most cases, vertical integra-
tion by a monopolist actually creates substantial efficiencies that result in
increased consumer welfare, rather than the presumed anticompetitive
effects. ' 8 9 They point out that a monopolist at any single level of a distri-
bution chain can recover all monopoly profits available in that chain.' 90
As a result, a double monopolist of two successive links will not make
more monopoly profits than a single monopolist. Furthermore, they note
that entry barriers are raised only if the integrated business is more effi-
cient than its unintegrated competitors.' 9'
The reasoning that supports these efficiencies, however, is inapplica-
ble to the insurer because of its unique position in the marketplace. The
typical vertical integration model occurs when a manufacturer acquires
186. Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
187. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 150.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 150-51.
190. Id. at 150, 199.
191. Id. at 150-51.
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control over distribution of his product at another level of the production
chain, that is, when he acquires control over another point at which the
product is sold. For example, a shoe manufacturer could integrate verti-
cally by acquiring retail shoe stores. Vertical integration by a monopolist
insurer is atypical because of the insurer's position as both a buyer and
seller of the same product. The insurer vertically integrates by acquiring
market power at a purchasing point in the product chain. The insurer,
therefore, is in a position to control both the prices it charges to its in-
sureds (monopoly profits), as well as the prices it pays for the health
services those insureds receive (monopsony profits). This model does not
contain the flaw of the double monopoly model in which the monopolist
would have to extract monopoly profits from itself to profit from both
monopolies.192 Therefore, the argument that a monopolist at any one
level in a production chain captures all the available monopoly profits
ignores the monopsony profits available to the insurer.
The most recent cases dealing with secondary market manipulation
by a monopolist reflect the Chicago School view that allocative efficiency
is the overriding goal of antitrust law.193 For example, in Paschall v.
Kansas City Star 94 a divided Eighth Circuit court sitting en banc re-
versed a divided panel decision and held that a monopolist newspaper
publisher who expanded its monopoly into a secondary market by
switching from independent carriers to a self-distribution system did not
violate section 2 of the Act. 195 The court found that the integration re-
sulted in procompetitive effects, such as a price reduction to some of the
newspaper's subscribers and the potential for a wider range of services to
individual readers. 196 Thus, the court reasoned that consumers were not
harmed because prices went down and output increased. The dissent,
however, pointed out that only eight percent of the subscribers would
receive a price reduction and that the other ninty-two percent would re-
ceive a price increase. 97 The court did not address how a price decrease
to only eight percent of the relevant market and the unsupported allega-
tion of the potential of additional services could weigh so heavily in the
competitive balance.
Because an anticompetitive effect as defined by the Chicago School
is either increased price or decreased output in the secondary market that
192. Id. at 199.
193. See supra note 41 & accompanying text.
194. 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'g 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982). Paschall is
a recent case demonstrating a "rethinking" that resulted in a conclusion consistent with the
Chicago School tenets. See generally Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the Newspaper Mo-
nopolist, 69 IOWA L. REv. 451 (1984) (criticism of panel decision from Chicago School point
of view).
195. 727 F.2d at 704.
196. Id. at 701-04.
197. Id. at 705.
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affects consumers, the holding in Paschall indicates that even the
strained presence of these indicators is sufficient to declare vertical inte-
gration by a monopolist to be legal. Thus, the Paschall court's protection
of a monopolist's vertical integration represents a triumph of allocative
efficiency over distributive goals.
The most onerous anticompetitive effect of fixed fees as defined by
the Chicago School may be reduced output in the market for physicians'
services. Reduced output could occur through two mechanisms. First,
the fixed fees may decrease the availability of premium and innovative
services resulting in technologically static, less individualized, and less
effort-intensive medical treatment. Plans that set maximum fees have
been held to eliminate any financial reward for excellence, as well as the
incentive for individual improvement or innovation. 98 Providers who
want to compete by offering innovative or "premium" services may be
discouraged from doing so because the pricing structure presumes that
doctors' services are fungible. 99 The fees provide the same economic
rewards to all practitioners regardless of their skill, experience, or will-
ingness to employ innovative and difficult procedures. 200 In addition, the
fixed-fees plans fail to compensate differentially for difficult and easy
cases. 20  Thus, superior treatment often may be undercompensated and
198. See supra note 150.
199. See supra note 150.
200. See Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982). The disincentive
to innovate is worthy of some further discussion. Innovation is the result of a conscious search
for new and better solutions to pressing problems; such search activity is triggered by the stress
of a competitive market. F. SHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 423 (2d ed. 1980). There are two distinguishable types of innovation: that
which leads to a qualitatively better existence and that which raises productivity. Id. at 408.
In the context of the Blue Shield plans, a cap on providers' fees decreases providers' revenue.
Decreased revenue would affect quality innovation because there would be fewer resources
(time) available to develop or learn qualitatively better procedures. Further, providers would
have less incentive to spend the time or money to develop better techniques because any qual-
ity above the minimum standard would be unrecompensed.
Conversely, decreased revenue would likely have the opposite effect on productivity or
efficiency creating innovation. Because the mainstay of the fixed-fee plans is volume, any pro-
cedure that increased efficiency and allowed a greater number of procedures to be performed
could expect to be actively sought by participating providers. Although there are entry costs
associated with efficiency-creating innovation as well, because such innovation would result in
increased volume, the entry costs could be expected to be offset by the increased revenue that
would result from the increased volume. Thus, the fixed-fee plans could be expected to chan-
nel providers' innovation toward efficiency and away from qualitatively better procedures.
The long-term effects of such a trend on health care and consumer welfare are as yet untraced.
For a discussion of the effects of firm size and concentration on innovation, see id. at 413-22;
Markham, Concentration: A Stimulus or Retardant to Innovation?, in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-
TRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 247-48 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
201. See Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 751 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 204 (1985).
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below-average treatment overcompensated. 20 2 For example, a physician
treating a case that is unusual, or in which complications develop, is not
allowed to charge any more than a physician treating the simplest, most
responsive form of the same illness. In some cases, repeated palliative
treatments would result in greater reimbursement to the provider than
would curative treatments.
The second way PPOs may reduce output is by hastening the exit of
providers from the market. Any physician unwilling to forego innova-
tion or to compromise the quality of his care may be restricted to an ever
dwindling supply of patients. 20 3 At some point, that physician may be
forced to seek patients outside the relevant geographic market, resulting
in increased transaction costs to the physician, thereby decreasing the
availability of his service (output).
The Chicago School also would measure the anticompetitive effects
of an insurer's integration in terms of increased cost. First, higher medi-
cal costs could result to patients not enrolled in a PPO, as participating
physicians increase costs to those fee-for-service patients in order to sub-
sidize the patients covered by PPOs.2° 4 This increase probably would be
short term, however, because as the cost for private care increased, so
would the demand for the plans.
205
If lower prices are accompanied by restricted services, however, con-
sumers' long-term interests, the focus of distributive antitrust ideologists,
are likely to be harmed. 20 6 Conventional price theory supports this con-
clusion. Under conventional price theory, if a monopsonist insurer
supressed prices below what physicians considered acceptable for quality
treatment, more and more physicians would try to avoid contracting
with the insurer and capture a larger share of the remaining fee-for-ser-
vice market by lowering their rates. A consumer's long-term interests
would be harmed because price competition would ensure that physi-
cians were charging only marginally above cost,20 7 thereby causing all
202. Id. at 753; see Easterbrook, supra note 61, at 899.
203. See Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 751, 751-52 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 749 F.2d 922
(1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 204 (1985).
204. Using one group of patients to subsidize another lower paying group also has oc-
curred in the context of indigent patients. See Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1985, at 33, col. 5; see also
Rankin & Wilson, supra note 68, at 606 n.27 (providers allege that they are forced to charge
more to uninsured patients); Rayack, The Physicians'Service Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 396 (N. Adams 6th ed. 1982) (sliding fees used to raise prices above
those established by health insurers).
205. As the demand for the Blue Shield plan increases, the market for physicians' services
could dwindle even further until eventually the nonparticipating providers would be driven out
of business. See Rankin & Wilson, supra note 68, at 606 n.27.
206. See Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 751, 753 n.25 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 749 F.2d 922
(1st Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 204 (1985).
207. Marginal cost is the additional cost that a firm incurs in the production of one unit of
output. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 10-14.
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nonprice competition20 8 and any incentive to employ new or cost-inten-
sive procedures to cease. Such procedures would be employed only if the
cost of learning or using them (entry costs) could be recovered through
an increased volume of care at the lower prices.
The fixed-fee plans also may harm consumers' long-term interests by
discouraging new competitor entry into the service market, especially in
certain geographic markets. The binding and restrictive nature of fixed
fees may tend to decrease the desirability of areas in which insurers have
market power.
20 9
The fixed fees imposed through PPOs arguably restrict the funda-
mental freedom of physicians to bargain for and receive a market-deter-
mined price for services rendered. At least one court has felt that fixed-
fee plans tend to "distort, eliminate, and impede price competition
among physicians ' 210 by increasing prices and decreasing both output
and consumer welfare.
21'
Differing Antitrust Policy Goals
Because the argument can be made that fixed-fee arrangements cre-
ate anticompetitive effects in the market for physician services, the com-
petitive effects of a PPO must be examined under the various antitrust
ideologies adopted by the courts to determine when and if, in fact, these
effects are anticompetitive. This section of the Note examines whether
PPOs create anticompetitive effects in violation of section 2 under either
the Chicago School ideology or distributive ideology.
The effects of a monopsonist insurer on the secondary market for
physicians' services may be viewed as unreasonably anticompetitive
whether evaluated under either of the above models. Any court follow-
ing the Chicago School almost certainly will consider the anticompetitive
effects of PPOs unreasonable. Fixed fees do not benefit consumers when
they reduce output, decrease innovation, and increase provider exodus
from the market. Furthermore, medical prices for the participating pro-
viders' remaining fee-for-service consumers are likely to increase in the
short term. Although under classical price theory a long-term price de-
208. Nonprice competition refers to those services involved in marketing products. Gen-
erally, these include overhead expenses such as offices, salespeople, advertising, and service
departments. See generally id. at 252.
209. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 204 (1985).
210. Id. at 754.
211. The Department of Justice recently sought to challenge a provider-based PPO in
Stanislaus County, California. Two indications that the PPO seemed to be anticompetitive in
nature were the involvement of more than 50% of the providers in one market and 90% in
another, and the requirement that providers not join another PPO without express approval.
Psychiatric News, June 7, 1985, at 3 (citing speech to 33rd American Bar Association spring
meeting by J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division).
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crease could result, it probably also would be accompanied by a decrease
in output.
A court that adopted the distributive ideology also would consider
the anticompetitive effects of PPOs unreasonable. This ideology stresses
distributive goals and focuses on protecting consumers' long-term inter-
ests and protecting the competitive process. 212 The fixed-fee plans and
their effects on a secondary market fail to meet the goals of this model.
A health care system that treats physicians' services as fungible, discour-
ages innovation and individualized treatment plans, and fosters competi-
tion based on quantity rather than quality of care, could hardly be said to
serve consumers' long-term interests. The cost containment effects of
PPOs provide a small benefit in contrast to the insidious change PPOs
may cause in the quality of health care available in this country. Fur-
thermore, the plan may hamper the competitive process by imposing the
will of one firm with market power on thousands of independent provid-
ers. Therefore, it would destroy an environment conducive to vigorous
rivalry that can lead to efficiency and progressiveness.
Thus, whether evaluated by a court looking to efficiency or distribu-
tive goals, PPOs create anticompetitive effects on the secondary market
for physician's services. Consequently, certain PPO fee arrangements are
contrary to section 2 of the Act.
Conclusion
The recent increase in litigation by service providers against insurer-
organized PPOs signals a growing concern with the real and potential
competitive effects of insurer-set maximum fees. This concern centers
around an increasing loss of control over many aspects of health and
patient care traditionally considered to be under the exclusive control of
the private practitioner.
Based on Maricopa 213 and the pharmacy cases beginning with Royal
Drug,214 the first lawsuits to challenge fixed-fee plans were poorly
pleaded and narrowly analyzed. Relying on dicta in Royal Drug, courts
have characterized the relationship of insurer and provider as that of a
standard buyer and seller without sufficient consideration of the insured-
patient's role. The courts have overlooked that, in certain phases of the
insured's coverage, namely the pre-deductible period, the provider and
patient have a direct fee-for-service relationship. An accurate character-
ization of the insurer as an indemnitor rather than a buyer provides the
212. See Fox, supra note 40, at 1167.
213. Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). For a discussion of Mari-
copa, see supra notes 63-74 & accompanying text.
214. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). For a discus-
sion of Royal Drug, see supra notes 75-85 & accompanying text.
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necessary resale component to establish resale price maintenance in vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In certain situations, insurer-organized PPOs may violate section 2
of the Sherman Act. In particular geographic markets in which the in-
surer has a monopoly in the market for health insurance, the insured-
organized PPO has a monopsony in the market for physician services.
Vertical integration of this sort by insurers such as Blue Shield has re-
sulted in demonstrable anticompetitive effects in the market for physician
services whether evaluated under the Chicago School or traditional anti-
trust objectives.
Christine Gasparovich *
* Member, Third Year Class.
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